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I. InTroduCTIon 
In this contribution we are going to analyse the way 
the interpretation by the Court of Justice (CJ) of the 
citizenship provisions, and the CJ’s novel reinterpre-
tation of the free movement rights, have affected 
social security systems, and in particular how they 
relate in a new way with the secondary legislation 
which coordinates national provisions concerning 
welfare benefits (527).
However, before critically assessing the impact of 
the free movement provisions on the coordination 
of social security systems, and on access of welfare 
benefits more generally, it is first necessary to recall 
526( ) I am very grateful to Yves Jorens and Michael Couchier for having 
organised such a stimulating conference and to the participants of 
the conference for a lively discussion.
527( ) There is an extensive body of literature on the effect of Union 
citizenship on welfare provision; e.g. G. de Búrca (ed.) EU law and the 
welfare state (OUP, 2005); M. Dougan and E. Spaventa (eds) Social 
welfare and EU law (Hart Publishing, 2005); A. Somek ‘Solidarity 
decomposed: being and time in European citizenship’ (2007), 
European Law Review 787.
the basic principles established by the case-law in 
relation to the free movement rights.
Since the 1970s, when the free movement provi-
sions became directly effective, the CJ has elabo-
rated a bi-partite test to establish the compatibility 
with Community law of national rules which are not 
directly discriminatory. First, a national rule must 
fall within the scope of the relevant Treaty provi-
sion; and second, it must be justified (528). In order 
to be justified a rule must pursue a public interest 
compatible with Community law (and unless the 
rule is clearly protectionist this will always be the 
case); and it must be necessary and proportionate.
For practical purposes, the real test for assessing 
compatibility with Community law once a rule is 
found to fall within the scope of the free movement 
provisions is then the proportionality/necessity test. 
Whilst, in theory, it is for the national court to assess 
528( ) Consistent case-law, see, for example, Case 33/74 C. H. M. Van Bisbergen v 
Bestuur van de Bedrijsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid [1974] ECR 1299. 
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proportionality, the CJ often engages in such exercise. 
Since the assessment of proportionality is a powerful 
tool, in that it allows the judiciary to scrutinise the 
legitimacy of the way policy choices are pursued by 
the legislature, the CJ has been accused of pushing 
its own vision of the internal market at the expenses 
of (more legitimate) political choices exercised by the 
legislative institutions at national and European level. 
This criticism became stronger in the mid-1990s, fol-
lowing a considerable expansion of the definition of 
barrier to movement relevant to bring a factual situa-
tion within the scope of the Treaty (529). As the scope of 
the Treaty expanded, so did the fields in which the CJ 
could scrutinise the proportionality of national rules 
and therefore become the final arbiter as to the legiti-
macy of national regulatory practices which, far from 
being discriminatory, sometimes reflected true politi-
cal choices not only as to the level of regulation in the 
market, but also about the way public expenditure 
should be organised (530).
The effects of the introduction of Union citizenship, 
which became apparent only in the late 1990s (531), 
determined a further expansion of the scope of the 
Treaty: this time, however, the rules under scrutiny 
were not market rules and indeed many rules con-
cerned access to welfare provision (532); furthermore, 
some of the rules which came under scrutiny were 
the result of the correct implementation of second-
ary Community legislation, and therefore of politi-
cal choices made at the highest level (533). As a result 
529( ) The move towards non-discriminatory barrier case-law was first visible 
in Case C-76/90 M. Säger v Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd [1991] ECR I-4221, in 
relation to the free movement of services; it was then extended to the 
freedom of establishment in Case C-55/94 Gebhard v Consiglio dell’Ordine 
degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1995] ECR I-4165; and to the free 
movement of workers in Case C-415/93 Union Royal Belge des Sociétés de 
Football Association ASBL v Jean-Marc Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921. 
530( ) For example, the case-law on the possibility to claim reimbursement 
for healthcare received abroad, Case C-157/99 B. S. M. Geraets-Smits 
v Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and Peerbooms v Stichting CZ Groep 
Zorgverzekeringen [2001] ECR I-5473, and see more detail below.
531( ) Starting from the ruling in Case C-85/96 M. M. Martínez Sala v Freistaat 
Bayern [1998] ECR I-2691.
532( ) For example, Case C-85/96 M. M. Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern 
[1998] ECR I-2691; Case C-184/99 R. Grzelczyk v Centre public d’aide 
social d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve [2001] ECR I-6193.
533( ) For example, Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R. v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-7091, in relation to the 
requirements to be satisfied by economically inactive citizens in order 
to gain a right of residence; Case C-209/03 Bidar [2005] ECR I-2119, in 
relation to access to maintenance loans; see more detail below. 
of this case-law, the CJ was then accused of ‘welfare 
engineering’, i.e. of attempting to create, single-
handily and with little political backing, a transna-
tional welfare space where Union citizens would 
have to assume some responsibility for the fate of 
their fellow (non-national) Union citizens. This said, 
it is open to debate whether the case-law in the 
last decade is better conceptualised as a revolu-
tion or as simply an evolution which, even though 
it caught many by surprise, was consistent with the 
deeper integration necessary for encouraging, if 
not all together establishing, an ever closer union 
amongst the peoples of Europe (534).
In this contribution I am going to look at the rel-
evant case-law to assess the impact of the free 
movement and the citizenship provisions on social 
security coordination and access to welfare bene-
fits. In particular, I am going to focus on the tension 
between the primary Treaty provisions, as inter-
preted by the CJ, and secondary legislation (in par-
ticular Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 and Directive 
2004/38/EC) (535). I will address these problems the-
matically rather than historically or having regard 
to the subject matter. Two main themes emerge: 
the expansion of the scope of the Treaty through 
a ‘hermeneutic trick’; and the binary approach 
adopted by the CJ to expand the rights of individu-
als without challenging the legality of Commu-
nity secondary legislation. Before addressing these 
issues, it is, however, worth recalling briefly the 
consequences of Union citizenship insofar as the 
application of the principle of non-discrimination 
on grounds of nationality is concerned.
534( ) See preambles to the TEC and TEU. 
535( ) Council Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 on the application of social 
security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons 
ad to members of their families moving within the Community, as 
amended. Consolidated version [1997] (OJ L 28, 30.1.1997, p. 1;   
http ://w w w.europa.eu. int/eur- lex/en/consleg/pdf/1971/
en_1971R1408_do_001.pdf); Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 will be 
repealed once Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of 
social security systems [2004] (OJ L 166, 30.4.2004, p. 1), will enter into 
force; Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and 
their family members to move and reside freely within the territory 
of the Member States (2004) (OJ L 229, 29.6.2004, p. 35) (hereinafter 
Directive 2004/38/EC).
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II. unIon CITIzenShIP and 
non-dISCrImInaTIon
I have recalled above that, in assessing the com-
patibility of national rules with the economic free 
movement provisions, the CJ adopts a bi-partite 
approach: first, analysis of the existence of a bar-
rier that brings the situation within the scope of 
the Treaty; and, second, assessment of the exist-
ence of a public interest capable of justifying the 
rule, which includes the proportionality assess-
ment. Clearly, the broader the scope of the defi-
nition of barrier to movement, the broader the 
scope for the CJ’s assessment of the proportional-
ity of national rules. And yet, until the late 1990s, 
the claimant could bring herself within the scope 
of the free movement provisions only after having 
established an economic link (however weak) (536). 
With the introduction of Union citizenship, how-
ever, the economic link is no longer necessary and 
migration alone (if even needed) (537) suffices to 
bring the claimant within the scope of the Treaty 
by virtue of Article 18 EC (538). Furthermore, once 
the claimant is within the scope of the Treaty, s/he 
can rely on the general prohibition of discrimina-
tion on grounds of nationality contained in Article 
12 EC (539). And the prohibition of nationality dis-
crimination is interpreted in a broad way so as to 
encompass not only direct discrimination but also 
536( ) In particular the CJ weakened the necessary economic link by 
allowing service recipients (mainly tourists) to rely on Article 12 EC 
in relation to anything connected to the reception of tourist services; 
see, for example, Case 186/87 Cowan v le Trésor Public [1989] ECR 
195; Case C-45/93 Commission v Spain (museum admission) [1994] 
ECR I-911. 
537( ) See, for example, Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] ECR I-11613, 
where the mere desire to move in the future was enough to 
bring the situation within the scope of the Treaty; Case C-212/06 
Government of the French Community and Walloon Government 
v Flemish Government [2008] ECR I-1683, where the notion of 
potential discouragement was used in a case which would have 
otherwise been purely internal; and Case C-403/03 Schempp 
[2005] ECR I-6421, where movement of the former wife of the 
claimant was enough to establish the intra-Community link. I have 
argued elsewhere in favour of formally departing from the need 
to establish an intra-Community link so as to extend the scope 
of the Treaty to cover also (some) purely internal situations; see 
E. Spaventa ‘Seeing the woods despite the trees? On the scope 
of Union citizenship and its constitutional effects’, (2008) 45, 
Common Market Law Review 13. 
538( ) For example, Case C-224/98 M. N. D’Hoop v Office national d’emploi 
[2002] ECR I-6191.
539( ) For example, Case C-85/96 M. M. Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern 
[1998] ECR I-2691.
indirect discrimination, and in particular discrimi-
nation on grounds of residence or on grounds of 
length of residence (540), as well as discrimination 
on grounds of migration (541).
Clearly, since it is common for entitlement to wel-
fare provision to be restricted to those residing 
and/or contributing through their economic activ-
ity, and to nationals who need not prove a link of 
‘belonging’ to their own state, the combination of 
Articles 18 and 12 EC is to challenge established 
requirements in relation to entitlement to welfare 
provision in the territory of another Member State. 
Furthermore, since the prohibition of discrimina-
tion on grounds of nationality and/or the right 
to movement have been consistently interpreted 
so as to encompass the right not to be discrimi-
nated on grounds of movement, Article 18 EC also 
strained, if not altogether challenged, the rules as 
to the non-exportability of certain benefits, and in 
particular of special non-contributory benefits (542). 
As we shall see in detail further below, this does not 
mean that Member States are now obliged to grant 
benefits or allow exportability to any Union citizen 
regardless of the circumstances of the case; rather, 
it means that national rules providing for entitle-
ment requirements are now subject to the scrutiny 
of the Community or/and the national courts as to 
their necessity and proportionality. 
III. The ProCeSS oF 
deConSTruCTIng and 
reConSTruCTIng The 
SCoPe oF The TreaTy
I mentioned above that one of the effects of the 
introduction of Union citizenship is to sever the link 
between economic activity and entitlement to rights 
under Community law. This is particularly important 
540( ) For example, Case C-192/05 Tas-Hagen and Tas [2006] ECR I-10451; 
Case C-209/03 Bidar [2005] ECR I-2119. 
541( ) For example, Case C-224/98 M. N. D’Hoop v Office national d’emploi 
[2002] ECR I-6191.
542( ) For example, Case C-192/05 Tas-Hagen and Tas [2006] ECR I-10451.
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in relation to welfare benefits, including benefits fall-
ing within the scope of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71, 
which before were reserved to economically active 
migrants. The effect of the introduction of Article 18 
EC then is to open up new possibilities for those who 
were previously excluded from the scope of Com-
munity law because they did not engage in work or 
did not provide or receive services. However, in the 
early stages of interpretation of Article 18 EC, it was 
unclear what this actually meant. Thus, the Mem-
ber States had a legitimate expectation that Union 
citizenship would simply codify the status quo in 
primary Treaty law. In this respect, it should not be 
forgotten that prior to the Maastricht Treaty three 
directives were adopted granting movement and 
residency rights to economically inactive people (543). 
Those directives restricted the rights of residence to 
those who were economically independent, who 
would therefore not qualify for means-tested ben-
efits, and who had health insurance in respect of all 
risks. Furthermore, the directives made clear that eco-
nomically independent migrants should not become 
an unreasonable burden on the welfare provision of 
the host state (544). Article 18 EC in turn referred to 
the limitations and conditions imposed by second-
ary legislation therefore, in the mind of the drafters, 
ring-fencing potential claims on welfare provision in 
the host state. Thus, the provisions and requirements 
contained in the residence directives would consti-
tute the limitations referred to by Article 18 EC and 
therefore economically inactive citizens would not 
have a claim on host welfare provision.
However, in Sala (545) the CJ took a different interpre-
tative path from that which could be expected and 
instead engaged in a process of deconstruction and 
543( ) Council Directive 90/364/EEC on the right of residence (OJ L 180, 
13.7.1990, p. 26); Council Directive 90/365/EEC on the right of 
residence for employees and self-employed persons who have 
ceased their occupational activity (OJ L 180, 13.9.1990, p. 28); Council 
Directive 93/96/EEC on the right of residence for students (OJ L 317, 
18.12.1993, p. 59).
544( ) Article 1 of Council Directive 90/364/EEC on the right of residence (OJ 
L 180, 13.7.1990, p. 26); Article 1 of Council Directive 90/365/EEC on 
the right of residence for employees and self-employed persons who 
have ceased their occupational activity (OJ L 180, 13.9.1990, p. 28); 
Article 1 of Council Directive 93/96/EEC on the right of residence for 
students (OJ L 317, 18.12.1993, p. 59).
545( ) Case C-85/96 M. M. Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I-2691.
reconstruction of Community law (546). The case con-
cerned the rights of a Spanish citizen lawfully living 
in Germany by virtue of a bilateral treaty between 
Germany and Spain (i.e. not by virtue of Community 
law). Even though Mrs Sala could not be deported, 
she was not entitled to a residence permit; and pos-
session of a residence permit was a precondition to 
access some welfare benefits, including the child-
raising allowance that Mrs Sala was denied exactly 
because she did not possess a residence permit. 
The allowance fell within the scope of both Regu-
lations (EEC) Nos 1408/71 (547) and 1612/68 (548); and 
the residence permit requirement was discrimina-
tory since it did not have to be satisfied by Ger-
man nationals. Since there were some doubts as 
to whether Mrs Sala could be considered a worker 
falling within the scope of either the regulations, or 
indeed of Article 39 EC, the question was whether 
the situation fell nonetheless within the scope of 
the Treaty by virtue of the citizenship provisions 
and if so whether Article 12 EC was applicable.
The CJ found that Mrs Sala fell within the scope 
ratione personae of the Treaty by virtue of being 
a Union citizen; it then found that the benefit in 
question fell within the scope ratione materiae of 
the Treaty by virtue of it falling within the scope of 
Regulations (EEC) Nos 1408/71 and 1612/68. Since 
the benefit fell within the scope of Community law 
and since Mrs Sala fell within the personal scope of 
the Treaty, Article 12 EC applied and Mrs Sala was 
entitled to the benefit.
The Sala ruling is concise and therefore difficult 
to understand: but what is interesting for our pur-
poses is the CJ’s reasoning in relation to what falls 
within the material scope of the Treaty. Such rea-
soning might appear rather circular, if not altogeth-
er perverse. In this respect consider that the fact 
that child-raising benefits fall within the scope of 
546( ) On the Sala ruling see S. O’Leary, ‘Putting flesh on the bones of 
European Union citizenship’ (1999), 24 European Law Review 68; J. 
Shaw and S. Fries, ‘Citizenship of the Union: First steps in the European 
Court of Justice’ (1998), 4 EPL 533.
547( ) As it was a family benefit falling within Article 4(1)(h). 
548( ) As it was a social advantage falling within the meaning of Article 7(2).
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Community law is not a novelty; however, accord-
ing to Community law it is only a given category 
of people defined in secondary legislation that can 
claim equal treatment for those benefits. In other 
words, it seems clear that, pre-Sala, the two con-
ditions (falling within the personal scope of Regu-
lation (EEC) No 1408/71, of Regulation (EEC) No 
1612/68 or of Article 39, and within their material 
scope) had to be fulfilled simultaneously.
However, in Sala, the CJ deconstructs the way 
material and personal scope have to be interpret-
ed: as a result, rather than having to meet the two 
conditions in relation to the same piece of legisla-
tion, the two can be separated so that falling with-
in one of the Treaty provisions, and in particular 
within Article 18 EC, allows to claim equal treat-
ment in relation to any benefit ever mentioned 
by the Community legislature, even when the 
clear aim of the legislature is to limit the claimants 
entitled to a given benefit and therefore exclude 
all other claimants from the possibility to invoke 
equal treatment.
The impact of Union citizenship on social securi-
ty claims is then dramatic in that it opens up the 
potential class of citizens entitled to rely on equal 
treatment in order to obtain welfare provision from 
the host state. And yet, reliance on Articles 18 and 
12 EC rather than on Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 
is conceptually different and might lead to differ-
ent outcomes: indirect discrimination can be jus-
tified, and therefore the rights granted through 
Articles 18 and 12 EC appear, at least theoretically, 
more limited than those provided for in Regulation 
(EEC) No 1408/71 where, once a claimant succeeds 
in bringing herself within both the personal and 
the material scope of the regulation, she might be 
in a much stronger position than if she fell within 
Article 18 EC (549).
549( ) This will depend very much on what is claimed as in certain instances 
indirect discrimination can be justified also in relation to Regulation 
(EEC) No 1408/71; however, in cases such as exportability of benefits 
or the possibility to seek healthcare abroad, the regulation grants 
‘rights’ and Member States cannot depart from what is established by 
the regulation itself; see discussion below. 
This process of deconstruction and reconstruction 
is evident in other fields of Community law, and 
most notably in the field of education. It might 
be recalled that the students directive excluded 
the migrant student’s entitlement to maintenance 
grants awarded by the host state (550); and that it, as 
the other residence directives, provides that stu-
dents must have adequate resources so as not to 
become a burden on the social assistance of the 
host state. In a line of case-law that started with the 
ruling in Grzelczyk (551), the CJ applied the Sala rea-
soning to students.
Mr Grzelczyk, a French student in Belgium, claimed 
the minimex, a minimum subsistence allowance, 
in order to be able to focus on his studies during 
the last year of his university degree. Mr Grzelczyk 
was denied the benefit since he was not a ‘worker’ 
pursuant to Community law and therefore could 
not rely on Article 7(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 
1612/68. The CJ found, however, that he fell within 
the scope of Community law by virtue of the citi-
zenship provisions and that, therefore, pursuant 
to the Sala ruling, he could claim equal treatment 
in relation to welfare benefits, including the min-
imex. In order to avoid the constraints imposed 
by secondary legislation, the CJ held that, whilst 
Directive 93/96/EEC expressly excluded foreign 
students from eligibility to maintenance grants, it 
did not exclude them explicitly from entitlement 
to other welfare benefits.
The ruling in Grzelczyk confirmed the Sala ruling in 
that it clarified that lawfully resident Union citizens 
might rely on Article 12 EC in order to claim wel-
fare benefits regardless of the constraints imposed 
by secondary Community law. However, in Grzelc-
zyk, the CJ also qualified the Sala ruling, since it 
accepted that excessive reliance on the host wel-
fare system might transform the citizen into an 
550( ) Article 3 of Council Directive 93/96/EEC on the right of residence for 
students (OJ L 317, 18.12.1993, p. 59).
551( ) Case C-184/99 R. Grzelczyk v Centre public d’aide social d’Ottignies-
Louvain-la-Neuve [2001] ECR I-6193.
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‘unreasonable burden’ and, should that be the case, 
the Member State would be entitled to terminate 
the right of the Union citizen to reside in its terri-
tory (552). This concession to Member States’ preoc-
cupations in relation to excessive claims on their 
welfare provision is, however, much more limited 
than it might appear at first sight: first of all, the 
CJ does not clarify when a citizen would become 
an ‘unreasonable burden’ and, given that the prin-
ciple of proportionality always applies in those 
cases, it is clear that a once-off claim would not 
suffice to terminate the citizen’s right of residence 
and therefore their right to welfare provision (553). 
Second, this case-law significantly complicates the 
national administrative framework for eligibility to 
welfare benefits: lawfully resident Union citizens 
can no longer be denied welfare benefits on the 
sole grounds that they are economically inactive. 
Rather, and as clarified by subsequent case-law (554), 
the administrative authorities must investigate 
the claim to assess whether the burden imposed 
on the national welfare system is ‘reasonable’ or 
‘unreasonable’, which is to say that the administra-
tive authorities will have to conduct an assessment 
having regard to the particular circumstances of 
the claimant at issue. Finally, the CJ fails to specify 
whether the idea of ‘reasonableness’ in relation to 
the burden imposed on the public purse is to be 
assessed in relation to the single claim, in which 
case it would hardly ever be satisfied, or in rela-
tion to the potential cumulative effect of claims by 
several citizens.
The expansive effect of the Union citizenship pro-
visions is confirmed in subsequent case-law. In 
the case of Bidar (555), a French national who was 
552( ) Case C-184/99 R. Grzelczyk v Centre public d’aide social d’Ottignies-
Louvain-la-Neuve [2001] ECR I-6193, para. 42.
553( ) This principle has now been codified in Article 14(3) of Directive 
2004/38/EC. 
554( ) For example, see Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R. v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-7091, although this case 
concerned the right to reside rather than access to benefits; Case 
C-209/03 Bidar [2005] ECR I-2119.
555( ) Case C-209/03 Bidar [2005] ECR I-2119; noted by C. Barnard (2005) 
Common Market Law Review 1465; see also M. Dougan ‘Fees, grants 
and dole cheques: who covers the cost of migrant education within 
the EU?’ (2005), 42 Common Market Law Review 943.
undergoing his university education in the UK 
claimed a maintenance loan, which was denied on 
the grounds that he was not ‘settled’ in the UK for the 
purposes of the relevant legislation (556). It should 
be recalled that pursuant to Directive 93/96/EEC 
foreign students are not entitled to maintenance 
grants or maintenance loans from the host state. 
However, the CJ found that, since Mr Bidar had resid-
ed in the UK before becoming a university student, 
his right of residence derived not from the students 
directive but rather from Directive 90/364/EEC, 
the general residence directive. The latter did not 
explicitly exclude maintenance grants. Further-
more, the CJ found that maintenance grants fell 
within the scope of Community law following the 
adoption of Directive 2004/38/EC (even though 
the directive was not in force at the time of the rul-
ing). However, it should be noted that the directive 
excludes the right to equal treatment in relation 
to maintenance grants for economically inactive 
migrants until they have acquired the right to per-
manent residence (557). Nonetheless the CJ found 
that since such maintenance grants are available 
for workers and their family members, as well as for 
permanent residents, those grants fall within the 
scope of Community law and therefore, following 
the Sala ruling, Article 12 EC applies.
The Bidar ruling might have been recently at least 
partially overruled (558). However, for our purposes 
what is interesting is the reasoning underlying it: the 
process of deconstruction and reconstruction is not 
dissimilar from that adopted in Sala: the exclusion 
of someone from a benefit which is granted only to 
‘some’ citizens does not affect their rights under the 
primary Treaty provisions. Furthermore, a compari-
son between Grzelczyk and Bidar might be useful to 
556( ) According to the English rules at issue, in order to qualify for the 
maintenance loans a person needed to have resided in England for 
at least three years and the residence should not be wholly or in part 
for the purpose of receiving full-time education. Mr Bidar had resided 
in England for three years but he was attending school and therefore 
did not qualify for the loan.
557( ) Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC; economically inactive migrants 
gain full equal treatment rights after five years of lawful residence 
(right to permanent residence). 
558( ) Case C-158/07 Förster, judgment of 18 November 2008, not yet 
published, discussed below.
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fully appreciate the CJ’s desire to use hermeneutic 
tools in a teleological way, where the telos is the inte-
gration of the citizen not only in the host state but 
also in the host welfare community. Thus, note how 
effectively the CJ plays with secondary legislation to 
achieve the desired result: Mr Grzelczyk is entitled 
to the minimex because the students directive does 
not explicitly exclude it; and Mr Bidar, also a student, 
can instead rely on the general residence directive to 
avoid the explicit exclusion of entitlement to mainte-
nance grants provided for in the students directive.
The same expansive approach can be found also 
in the case of Collins (559). Mr Collins was an Irish 
national who moved to the UK to seek employ-
ment; within a week of his arrival he applied for a 
job-seeker’s allowance. The allowance was refused 
on the grounds that Mr Collins was not ‘habitu-
ally resident’ in the UK. According to pre-existent 
case-law, job-seekers only had a semi-status in 
Community law, so that they were not entitled to 
rely on Article 39(2) EC in relation to unemploy-
ment bene fits (560). However, the CJ held that fol-
lowing the introduction of Union citizenship it was 
no longer possible to exclude from the scope of 
Article 39(2) EC a benefit of a financial nature 
intended to facilitate access to employment in the 
host state. Since the habitual residence require-
ment was indirectly discriminatory, in that it could 
be more easily satisfied by own nationals, it needed 
to be justified. The CJ acknowledged that the resi-
dence requirement pursued the legitimate aim of 
ensuring that the claimant had established a genu-
ine link with the host employment market. However, 
the principle of proportionality demanded that the 
period of residence necessary to establish such a 
connection did not exceed what was necessary for 
the authorities to satisfy themselves of the fact that 
the person concerned is genuinely seeking work. 
Once again then, the CJ then requires Member 
States to have due regard to the particular circum-
stances of the claimant. Furthermore, the CJ’s ruling 
559( ) Case C-138/02 Collins [2004] ECR I-2703.
560( ) Case 316/85 Lebon [1987] ECR 2811.
is, again, at odds with the provisions of second-
ary legislation. In particular, Directive 2004/38/EC, 
which had been adopted at the time of the ruling 
although was not yet in force, provides that job-
seekers are excluded from the equal treatment obli-
gation in relation to welfare provision (561).
The Union citizenship case-law then has a consid-
erable impact on entitlement to welfare provision 
beyond what is provided for in secondary legisla-
tion. And what is particularly interesting for our 
purposes is this process of deconstruction and 
reconstruction of the scope of Community law so 
as to give effect to the citizenship provisions. As a 
result, the care that the legislature might take in 
limiting the class of potential claimants to welfare 
provision is of little consequence, if not altogether 
counter-productive, to the rights that citizens will 
derive from Community law (562). 
Iv. The bInary aPProaCh
We have seen above that following the introduction 
of Union citizenship the CJ has engaged in a proc-
ess of deconstruction and reconstruction of the 
scope of Community law which has deeply affected 
the obligations that Member States bear in relation 
to migrant Union citizens. We have seen also that 
this process of reconstruction takes as its starting 
point both Treaty provisions and secondary legisla-
tion which as a result relate in a novel way so as to 
stretch, if not altogether explode, the requirements 
to be satisfied by Union citizens before being eligi-
ble for welfare provision.
There is, however, another strand of case-law which is 
relevant in analysing the impact of the primary Trea-
ty provisions on the welfare systems of the Member 
561( ) On the issues raised by the ruling in Collins, see Advocate General 
Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer’s opinion in Joined Cases C-22/08 and 23/08 
Vatsouras, opinion delivered 12 March 2009, case still pending at the 
time of writing.
562( ) See also M. Dougan ‘Expanding the frontiers of European Union 
citizenship by dismantling the territorial boundaries of the national 
Member States?’ in C. Barnard and O. Odudu, The outer limits of 
European Union law (Hart Publishing, 2008), 119. 
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States: these are cases in which national rules which 
correctly implemented provisions of secondary legis-
lation were nonetheless found to be incompatible with 
the primary Treaty provisions, at least insofar as the 
specific case was concerned. Those cases concerned 
access to healthcare provision in a state different from 
the one with which the claimant was insured.
It might be recalled that Article 22 of Regulation 
(EEC) No 1408/71 provides, inter alia, that those 
ensured in a Member State are entitled, prior 
authorisation of the competent Member State, 
to go to another Member State to there receive 
healthcare provision. According to the regulation, 
the authorisation might not be refused when the 
treatment is among the benefits provided for by 
the competent Member State; and where the claim-
ant cannot be given such treatment within the time 
normally necessary for obtaining the treatment in 
question having regard to the person’s current state 
of health and the probable course of the disease.
In a series of cases (563), the regime provided by the 
regulation came under strain as the CJ found that, 
even though the claimants did not fulfil the condi-
tions provided for by national rules correctly giving 
effect to Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71, they were 
still eligible for support under Article 49 EC. In Van-
braekel (564), the issue related to hospital treatment 
563( ) The healthcare cases have given rise to a lively academic debate; see, 
for example, P. Cabral, ‘Cross-border medical care in Europe: Bringing 
down a first wall’ (1999) 24 European Law Review 387; A. P. Van der Mei, 
‘Cross-border access to medical care in the European Union — Some 
reflections on the judgments in Decker and Kohll’ (1998), 5 MJ 277; 
M. Fuchs ‘Free movement of services and social services: Quo vadis?’ 
(2002), 8 European Law Journal 536; E. Steyger ‘National health care 
systems under fire (but not too heavily)’ (1999) 29 LIEI 97; A. P. Van der 
Mei. ‘Cross-border access to medical care in the European Union — 
Some reflections on Garaets-Smits and Peerbooms and Vanbraekel’ 
(2002), 9 MJ 189; G. Davies ‘Welfare as a service’ (2002), 29 LIEI 27; and 
V. Hatzopoulos ‘Killing the national health systems but healing the 
patients? The European market for healthcare after the judgment of 
the ECJ in Vanbraekel and Peerbooms’ (2002), 39 Common Market Law 
Review 683; E. Spaventa ‘Public services and European law: Looking for 
boundaries’ (2002–03), 5 CYELS 271; T. Hervey ‘Mapping the contours 
of European Union health law and policy’ (2002), 8 EPL 69; A. Dawes 
‘Bonjour Herr Doctor: National healthcare systems, the internal market 
and cross-border medical care within the European Union’ (2006), 33 
LIEI 167; G. Davies ‘Competition, free movement and consumers of 
public services’ (2006), 17 EBL Rev. 95; C. Newdick ‘Citizenship, free 
movement and health care: Cementing individual rights by corroding 
social solidarity’ (2006), 43 Common Market Law Review 1645. 
564( ) Case C-368/98 Abdon Vanbreakel and Others v Alliance nationale des 
mutualités chrétiennes [2001] ECR I-5363.
administered by an institution in a Member State 
other than that with which the patient was affiliated. 
The question did not concern the prior authorisa-
tion, which had been granted ex post, but rather the 
level of reimbursement. According to the provisions 
of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 the migrant patient 
has a right to receive healthcare in another Member 
State has if she were insured with the latter’s system. 
In the case at issue, reimbursement according to the 
rules of the host state was less advantageous than 
reimbursement according to the rules of the Mem-
ber State of provenance. The CJ held that Article 
49 EC grants a right to be reimbursed according to 
the rules of the state of provenance: in the case in 
which a patient falls within both the scope of Reg-
ulation (EEC) No 1408/71 and of Article 49 EC, she 
can choose to be reimbursed according to the most 
favourable rules. In the case in which, however, the 
patient falls only within the scope of Article 49 EC 
since she does not meet the condition provided for 
in the regulation, reimbursement will always be lim-
ited to the tariffs established by the home Member 
State (565). Further, in Peerbooms (566), the CJ held that 
the prior authorisation required by national law to be 
eligible for reimbursement of expenses for medical 
treatment incurred abroad was a barrier falling with-
in the scope of Article 49 EC and needed therefore 
to be justified, even though the prior authorisation 
requirement is provided for in Regulation (EEC) No 
1408/71. In Müller Fauré (567), the CJ went further and 
held that in the case of non-hospital treatment the 
prior authorisation requirement is incompatible with 
Article 49 EC, even though again the prior authorisa-
tion requirement is provided for in Regulation (EEC) 
No 1408/71; and in Watts the CJ made clear that the 
existence of waiting lists is not a sufficient reason to 
deny authorisation to seek treatment abroad (568).
565( ) See also Case C-385/99 Müller Fauré v Onderlinge 
Waarborgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzekeringen UA, and van Riet v 
Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappi ZAO Zorgverzekeringen [2003] 
ECR I-4509.
566( ) Case C-157/99 B. S. M. Garaets-Smits v Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ 
and Peerbooms v Stichting CZ Groep Zorgverzekeringen [2001] ECR 
I-5473.
567( ) Case C-385/99 Müller Fauré v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij 
OZ Zorgverzekeringen UA, and van Riet v Onderlinge 
Waarborgmaatschappi ZAO Zorgverzekeringen [2003] ECR I-4509.
568( ) Case C-372/04 Watts [2006] ECR I-4325.
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In all those cases, the CJ did not question the fact 
that those national rules were compatible with 
the regime established by Regulation (EEC) No 
1408/71; nor did it question the regime estab-
lished by the regulation itself; and yet, it found 
the national rules at issue to be incompatible with 
Article 49 EC. The question is then how to reconcile 
the compatibility of the regime introduced by the 
regulation, which provides for the prior authori-
sation requirement, with the case-law of the CJ. 
After all, if the prior authorisation requirement 
is a hindrance to movement which is caught by 
Article 49 EC and needs to be justified, and which 
is in certain cases incompatible with Community 
law, then Article 22(1)(c) of Regulation (EEC) No 
1408/71, which provides for said prior authorisa-
tion, should also be deemed incompatible with 
the primary Treaty provisions (569).
This discrepancy, which arises in a similar way in 
relation to the requirements to be satisfied in order 
to be eligible for residency rights in the citizen-
ship context, is therefore difficult to explain. In the 
wake of the Baumbast ruling (570), Michael Dougan 
and I argued that the CJ has introduced a cleav-
age approach to the interpretation of the relation-
ship between primary and secondary legislation in 
relation to Union citizenship (571). Thus, the black-
letter rights provided by the then three residence 
directives, and now by Directive 2004/38/EC, con-
stitute the floor of rights granted to Union citizens. 
If the citizen satisfies those requirements then she 
is automatically entitled to the right to reside. 
That is true also in relation to healthcare provision 
569( ) The Commission has put forward a proposal for a directive codifying 
the case-law on healthcare provision; see proposal for a directive on 
the application of patients’ rights (2008) (COM(414) final); the proposal 
was approved with amendments by the European Parliament on 
23 April 2009.
570( ) See Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R. v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2002] ECR I-7091.
571( ) M. Dougan and E. Spaventa, ‘Educating Rudy and the (non-)English 
patient: A double-bill on residency rights under Article18 EC’ (2003), 
28 European Law Review 699; see also M. Dougan ‘The constitutional 
dimension to the case-law on Union citizenship’ (2006), 31 European Law 
Review 613; and E. Spaventa, Free movement of persons in the European 
Union — Barriers to movement in their constitutional context (Kluwer 
Law International 2007), especially Chapters 6 and 7; and E. Spaventa, 
‘Seeing the woods despite the trees? On the scope of Union citizenship 
and its constitutional effects’ (2008), 45 Common Market Law Review 13.
abroad pursuant to Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 
(and probably in relation to many if not all of the 
rights granted by the regulation): if the patient is 
granted prior authorisation, or s/he satisfies the 
requirements for prior authorisation, then s/he 
has a right to travel to another Member State and 
receive benefits in kind as if s/he were insured in 
that Member State. However, if the citizen fails to 
satisfy the black-letter requirements imposed by 
Community secondary legislation, be that Direc-
tive 2004/38/EC or Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71, 
then s/he might have a right in primary legislation 
which is at the same time more limited and more 
extensive than that granted by secondary legisla-
tion. It is more extensive because it clearly goes 
beyond what is provided in secondary law; but 
it is also more limited since it will depend on an 
appraisal of the factual circumstances at stake and 
on whether denial of the right is a justified and pro-
portionate response by the Member State. The fact 
that now we have to see secondary legislation and 
primary Treaty provisions as constituting, respec-
tively, the floor and the ceiling of the rights grant-
ed in Community law was indirectly confirmed by 
the abovementioned ruling in Vanbrekael, where 
the CJ held that, when the patient falls within the 
scope of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71, she can 
choose between the level of reimbursement pro-
vided by the latter (i.e. that provided by the host 
state) and that provided by Article 49 EC (i.e. that 
provided by the state of origin).
The binary approach established through the case-
law, however shocking for the Member States, 
unwilling to see new obligations imposed on pub-
lic finances, especially when those result from what 
could be perceived as the bypassing of carefully 
reached political compromises, can be considered 
a development of established principles in rela-
tion to the free movement of persons. Here, since 
the 1970s, the CJ has made clear that rights that 
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derive directly from the Treaty can be clarified by 
secondary law, but are not per se ‘established’ by 
such case-law (572). Seen in this light, the case-law 
might appear less surprising: after all, the CJ has 
always considered that limits imposed in second-
ary legislation are not necessarily conclusive: they 
might be legitimate per se, since they would sat-
isfy what is perceived to be a legitimate public 
interest by the political institutions, and yet they 
cannot impinge on the interpretation given by 
the CJ to the primary Treaty provisions (although 
they might well drive it). It is for the latter alone to 
decide the boundaries of the rights granted by the 
Treaty: secondary legislation simply gives effect 
to those rights. And naturally, the content of the 
Treaty provisions, like that of constitutional rights, 
evolve with time, whilst black-letter provisions are 
less dynamic in nature. The binary approach thus 
makes perfect constitutional sense albeit it might 
ruffle some political feathers. 
v. The exPorTabIlITy 
oF beneFITS beyond 
regulaTIon (eeC) no 
1408/71
The binary approach adopted in relation to second-
ary legislation on the one hand, and Treaty rights 
on the other, has important repercussions in rela-
tion to the right to export benefits beyond the pro-
visions of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71. Here, the 
combination of the right to free movement granted 
by Article 18 EC and the interpretation technique 
adopted by the CJ (both the binary approach and 
the Sala approach) challenge residence require-
ments in relation to benefits covered by Regula-
tion (EEC) No 1408/71 even when such residence 
requirements would in themselves be compatible 
with the regulation. Thus, once again, the fact that 
a restriction is consistent with the regime provided 
572( ) For example, interpretation of the public policy derogation; or the fact 
that documents required by secondary legislation are mere evidence 
of the right at issue and are not constitutive of them; see, for example, 
Case C-459/99 Mouvement contre le racisme, l’antisémitisme et la 
xénophobie (MRAX) ASBL v Belgium [2002] ECR I-6591. 
for by secondary legislation is not conclusive as to 
its compatibility with Community law.
In De Cuyper the issue related to a residence 
requirement in relation to an unemployment 
allowance (573). Mr De Cuyper received such a ben-
efit from Belgium, and because he was above 50 
years of age he was exempted from the obligation 
to submit to the local control procedures. Howev-
er, the benefit was still conditional upon residence 
in the Belgian territory: following an inspection, 
the authorities found that Mr De Cuyper was liv-
ing in France and therefore terminated the ben-
efit and asked for repayment of the sums that had 
been granted whilst Mr De Cuyper was resident in 
France. Mr De Cuyper argued that the residence 
requirement was a restriction on his right to move 
and reside anywhere in the EU granted by Article 
18 EC. The CJ found that the benefit in question was 
indeed an unemployment benefit which according 
to the provisions of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 
could be made conditional upon residence in the 
territory of the state awarding the benefit (574). 
However, the CJ also found that since a residence 
requirement was a restriction to the rights granted 
to European citizens to move and reside anywhere 
in the Union, it fell within the scope of Article 18 EC 
even though it was allowed under Regulation 
(EEC) No 1408/71. For this reason, the requirement 
needed to be justified, i.e. pursue a legitimate 
interest and be proportionate and necessary for 
its achievement. In the case at issue, the residence 
requirement was justified since the authorities 
needed to be able to monitor compliance with the 
legal requirements upon which the granting of the 
benefit was conditional (575).
573( ) Case C-406/04 De Cuyper [2006] ECR I-6947; see also M. Cousins 
‘Citizenship, residence and social security’ (2007), European Law 
Review 386.
574( ) See the conditions contained in Article 69(1) of Regulation (EEC) No 
1408/71. 
575( ) See also Case C-228/07 Petersen [2008] ECR I-6989, where the CJ held 
that a residence requirement in relation to an unemployment benefit 
was a restriction to the free movement of workers (as it was applied 
to a migrant worker who transferred his residence back to his home 
state) and, in the case at issue, was not justified. 
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The fact that the residence requirement was justi-
fied in this case should not detract attention from 
the significance of the ruling. As seen already in the 
healthcare cases, as well as in the other citizenship 
cases, the fact that secondary legislation author-
ises a conduct on the part of the Member State 
no longer shelters the national rules from further 
scrutiny: thus, whether the residence requirement 
in relation to non-contributory benefits is going to 
be justified will depend very much on the facts of 
the case at issue. Furthermore, this case-law is not 
without its practical problems: authorities dealing 
with social security claims have already a consid-
erable job in checking eligibility for the benefits at 
issue, as well as policing against the risk of benefit 
fraud. The case-law of the CJ introduces a new lev-
el of complexity since the rules now not only have 
to be proportionate in the abstract, they also have 
to be proportionate having regard to the specific 
facts of the case at issue. This is well illustrated by 
the case of Hendrix (576). There the issue related to 
a benefit for disabled young people. The benefit 
supplemented the income that the disabled per-
son would obtain from working at a reduced rate 
under a Dutch government scheme. Mr Hendrix 
received the benefit until he moved his residence 
from the Netherlands to Belgium when, as a result 
of the change of place of residence, he was denied 
the benefit.
For the purposes of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71, 
the CJ classified the benefit as a special non-
contributory benefit which could therefore be 
legitimately reserved to those resident in the 
national territory (577). The CJ, however, also found 
that Mr Hendrix should be classified as a migrant 
worker falling within the scope of Regulation (EEC) 
No 1612/68 and Article 39 EC. Further, the CJ held 
that the benefit in question could be qualified as 
a ‘social advantage’; it then acknowledged that 
576( ) Case C-287/05 Hendrix [2007] ECR I-6909.
577( ) Cf. Article 10(a)1 of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71, and para. 38 of 
the ruling.
Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 explicitly provides 
that it does not affect rules adopted pursuant to 
Article 42, including Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71. 
However, the CJ also stated that Article 7(2) of Regu-
lation (EEC) No 1612/68 is the specific expression of 
the principle of equality contained in Article 39(2) EC, 
and should therefore be given the same meaning. 
As a result, the residence requirement needed to be 
justified, and be proportionate to the attainment 
of the aim sought. The CJ then found that, whilst a 
residence requirement would be in principle justi-
fied, its proportionality in the case at issue needed 
to be assessed by the national court. Thus, since 
according to Dutch law the residence requirement 
could be waived if it would give rise to an ‘unac-
ceptable degree of unfairness’, the CJ instructed 
the national court to interpret the legislation in the 
light of Community law, and in particular having 
regard to the fact that Mr Hendrix had exercised his 
Article 39 EC rights, and that he had retained a link 
with the Netherlands (578).
The binary approach according to which the 
regime established in secondary legislation is not 
conclusive even when such a regime is compatible 
with the Treaty deeply affects the non-exportabil-
ity of benefits. Thus, if a benefit can be exported 
according to the regime established by Regulation 
(EEC) No 1408/71, exportability will be a matter of 
right. However, in those instances where the bene-
fit is not one for which exportability is provided for 
in secondary legislation, the claimant falls in any 
case within the scope of Community law and it is 
for the Member State to justify the restriction. Fur-
thermore, and whilst in relation to those benefits 
which require the authorities to be ale to carry out 
checks, the residence requirement will be more 
easily justified, and the authorities might have to 
take into consideration the factual circumstances 
pertinent to the claimant. 
578( ) On the notion of real link see C. O’Brien, ‘Real links, abstract 
rights and false alarms: The relationship between the ECJ’s “real 
links” case-law and national solidarity’ (2008), 33 European Law 
Review 643. 
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vI. ImPaCT oF unIon 
CITIzenShIP on beneFITS 
PrevIouSly exCluded 
From CommunITy law
The introduction of Union citizenship has also had 
a pervasive effect in relation to the possibility to 
export benefits which previously fell altogether 
outside the scope of Community law, such as, for 
instance, pensions connected to war which accord-
ing to consistent case-law fell, pre-citizenship (579), 
altogether outside the scope of the Treaty.
Here, one should take care to properly understand 
the reasoning behind the case-law: it is not that 
those benefits now fall within the scope of Com-
munity law per se; rather it is that any restriction 
on the freedom to move and reside in another 
Member State falls within the scope of Article 18 
EC. This distinction is of paramount importance in 
relation to the application of the principle of equal 
treatment: since such benefits do not fall within 
the scope of Community law per se, a non-national 
would not be able to claim such benefits. However, 
a beneficiary who is entitled, under national law, 
to claim, for instance, a pension for civilian victims 
of war, or a war pension of sorts, might have the 
right to transfer her residence to another Member 
State without for this reason losing the right to the 
benefit in question. Otherwise, the right to move 
would be severely affected: if the pension or the 
benefit constitutes the main source of income for 
the claimant, s/he would be unable to exercise her 
right to move in Community law for fear of losing 
that benefit.
Thus, for instance, in Nerkowska (580), Ms Nerkows-
ka was a Polish citizen who during the war had 
been deported to Russia and, as well as losing her 
parents, suffered from lasting health problem as 
579( ) For example, Case 207/78 Even [1979] ECR 2019; Case C-315/94 de 
Vos [1996] ECR I-1417.
580( ) Case C-499/06 Nerkowska [2008] ECR I-3993; see also Case C-192/05 Tas-
Hagen and Tas [2006] ECR I-10451; and Case C-221/07 Krystyna Zablocka-
Weyhermüller, judgment of 12 December 2008, not yet published.
a result of her deportation. Under Polish law she 
was therefore entitled to a pension; however, such 
a benefit was conditional upon her residing in 
Poland, whilst Ms Nerkowska resided in Germany. 
The CJ found that the residence requirement was 
a disproportionate interference with Ms Nerkows-
ka’s right to move. On the one hand, if the resi-
dence requirement was aimed at ensuring that the 
claimant had sufficient connection with the terri-
tory of the state awarding the benefit, then it was 
disproportionate since Ms Nerkowska was a Polish 
national who had resided and worked in Poland 
for 20 years and therefore had established a suffi-
cient connection with Polish society. On the other 
hand, if the national authorities needed to subject 
her to some health or administrative checks they 
could simply demand that she return to Poland on 
an ad hoc basis. The residence requirement was 
therefore disproportionate.
As mentioned above the effect of this case-law 
is not to broaden the scope of Community law 
to incorporate benefits which were previously 
excluded: rather it is to limit the extent to which 
the Member States can indirectly restrict move-
ment by demanding that the beneficiary reside 
within the national territory. The distinction is 
important since, if the benefit were to fall within 
the material scope of the Treaty, then Member 
States would have to justify denial of benefits, 
which are clearly linked to nationality, to non-
nationals. This was confirmed by the CJ in the 
case of Baldinger (581), where the CJ held that 
a war-related benefit fell outside the scope of 
Community law (in that case Regulation (EEC) 
No 1612/68 and Article 39(2)). However, any resi-
dence requirement imposed by a Member State 
as a condition for eligibility for benefits now falls 
within the scope of Article 18 EC and needs there-
fore to be justified. 
581( ) Case C-386/02 Baldinger [2004] ECR I-8411.
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vII. The rulIng In FöRStER and 
The ImPaCT oF dIreCTIve 
2004/38/eC
A more general question, which can be answered 
only in a speculative way, is whether Directive 
2004/38/EC will have any impact on the case-law of 
the CJ. On the one hand, the directive codifies most 
of the case-law on citizenship and the free move-
ment of persons existing at the time of its drafting. In 
this respect, the directive clearly incorporates both 
the principle of proportionality and the incremen-
tal approach to rights in respect of welfare provi-
sions (582). Thus, whilst the requirements of sufficient 
resources and comprehensive health insurance for 
economically inactive citizens residing in the host 
state beyond three moths have been confirmed (583), 
the directive also makes clear that recourse to the 
social assistance of the host state cannot automati-
cally determine the expulsion of the citizen (584). 
Furthermore, the directive provides for a right to 
permanent residency which is acquired after five 
years of lawful residency in the host state (585). Once 
a citizen has become a permanent resident, s/he is 
entitled to equal treatment regardless of economic 
activity. The directive thus somehow codifies the 
idea of a ‘real link’ by establishing that such a link 
will be presumed after the citizen has resided in the 
host country for five years.
On the other hand, the provisions of the directive 
appear more restrictive than the case-law analysed 
above. In particular, pursuant to Article 24(2) eco-
nomically inactive citizens, as well as job-seekers, do 
not have a right to social assistance in the first three 
months of residence or longer if the job-seeker 
stays beyond three months. And economically inac-
tive citizens are not entitled to maintenance aids for 
students, including maintenance loans, until when 
582( ) See also Barnard, ‘Annotation on Bidar’ (2005), 42 Common Market 
Law Review 1465, who talks about a ‘quantitative approach’ to equal 
treatment (at p. 1468); and by the same author, ‘EU citizenship and 
the principle of solidarity’ in M. Dougan and E. Spaventa (eds), Social 
welfare and EU law (Hart Publishing, 2005), Chapter 8.
583( ) See Article 7(1)(b) of Directive 2004/38/EC.
584( ) See Article 14(3) of Directive 2004/38/EC.
585( ) See Article 16 of Directive 2004/38/EC.
they acquire permanent residency. As mentioned 
above, these provisions appear inconsistent with 
the CJ’s approach in both Collins and Bidar. It might 
be recalled that in Collins the CJ held that, whilst 
a residence requirement for entitlement to a job-
seeker’s allowance is justified, it must be limited 
to a length of time sufficient for the authorities to 
ascertain that the job-seeker has a real connection 
with the host employment market (586). Article 24(2), 
however, excludes any entitlement to social assist-
ance for those who are looking for a job. Similarly, 
in Bidar the CJ held that a student might be eligi-
ble for a maintenance loan if s/he has established 
a genuine link with the host state (587). In the case 
at issue, Mr Bidar had resided in the United King-
dom for three years, well short of the five years now 
required by Directive 2004/38/EC. The question is 
therefore whether the CJ will be willing to revisit 
its previous case-law; or whether it will continue to 
adopt a binary approach to secondary legislation 
so that if a citizen satisfies the conditions contained 
in Directive 2004/38/EC s/he will be automatically 
entitled to the rights therein granted; whilst if s/he 
does not the proportionality principle applies and 
entitlement will depend very much on the facts of 
the case at issue.
In the writer’s opinion the answer is mixed and in 
trying to foresee how the case-law might develop 
we should recall not only the constitutional princi-
ples developed by the CJ, but the reason for their 
development. In other words, we should distin-
guish between the constitutional principles ‘proper’ 
elaborated by the CJ in relation to Union citizenship, 
which should continue to apply, and those cases in 
which the end result was very much driven by the 
particular circumstances of the case, and that are 
unlikely to be of more general application. Starting 
from the latter, a useful, if confused, indication as to 
586( ) Case C-138/02 Collins [2004] ECR I-2703.
587( ) Case C-209/03 Bidar [2005] ECR I-2119.
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the possible future developments of the case-law 
comes from the recent ruling in Förster (588).
There, Ms Förster, a German citizen, went to the 
Netherlands in order to study and train as a teacher. 
During the course of her studies she was engaged 
in various jobs and received a maintenance grant 
as a worker. However, following an inspection, the 
awarding body found that she had not been work-
ing for a period of about six months and claimed 
repayment of the maintenance grant for the period 
in which she was not economically active. Accord-
ing to Dutch rules, economically inactive citizens 
qualified for maintenance grants only after five 
years of residence whilst at the time in which she 
was not employed Ms Förster had been residing in 
the Netherlands for little over three years. Ms Förster 
claimed that the Bidar ruling applied to her and that 
she should be entitled to equal treatment since she 
had demonstrated a sufficient link with the host 
country. It should also be noted that, after comple-
tion of her degree, Ms Förster found employment 
and therefore remained in the Netherlands.
The CJ found that the five-year residence require-
ment was justified and that it did not go beyond 
what is necessary to ensure that the Union citizen 
is integrated in the society of the host state. The CJ 
distinguished the case at issue from the ruling in 
Bidar, by relying on the fact that the British rules in 
the latter made it impossible for students to ever 
qualify for maintenance grants, since periods of 
residence for study purposes were not taken into 
consideration to establish length of residence. On 
the other hand, in Förster the reason why someone 
had resided in the Netherlands was immaterial for 
establishing the required length of residence.
The significance of the ruling in Förster might go 
well beyond the case of maintenance grants and 
raises questions as to how much of the case-law 
on citizenship, and possibly also on healthcare 
services, will survive. In this respect, in the writer’s 
588( ) Case C-158/07 Förster, judgment of 18 November 2008, not yet 
published.
opinion, the most important shift consists in the 
return to an abstract analysis of the rules at issue, 
rather than the assessment of the proportional-
ity of the application of the rules to the facts of a 
particular case. The case-law before Förster was 
heavily centred on the individual claimant, with all 
the problems that this might create for the admin-
istrative authorities, but with a real attention for 
the proportionality of the state’s response to that 
individual case. Thus, the notion of ‘real link’ that 
justified claims on the host welfare society was 
assessed having regard to the individual case and 
seemed aimed at distinguishing ‘good claimants’ — 
those in temporary difficulties (Grzelczyk), those 
who were truly in exceptional circumstances and 
were not trying to unduly exploit the generosity of 
the host society (Bidar), those who were bona fide 
claimants (Sala, Collins) — from ‘bad claimants’, i.e. 
benefit tourists. On the other hand, in Förster the CJ 
wholly disregards the situation of Ms Förster, who 
was clearly a bona fide claimant — someone who 
had engaged in paid work, who was there to stay 
and who found paid employment in the Nether-
lands — to return to an abstract assessment of the 
rules at issue. Furthermore, the CJ also disregards 
the legitimate expectation that its own case-law 
might have created, to reach a result — the repay-
ment of the grant received — that was as surpris-
ing as unfair on the claimant.
In the writer’s opinion Förster is a clear sign of the 
CJ’s willingness to accept legislative choices insofar 
as those are generally justified. In other words, the 
ruling in Förster might signal the CJ’s acceptance 
of the legitimacy to restrict support for students 
to those who have an economic link (because 
they themselves were economically active (589); or 
because they are the children of an economically 
active citizen); and to those who have established 
a genuine link with the host society through a very 
prolonged residence. Furthermore, the ruling in 
Förster should also be seen in the context of recent 
case-law where the CJ is exploring the potential 
589( ) See, for example, Case C-413/01 Ninni-Orasche [2003] ECR I-13187.
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of the citizenship provisions for the exportability 
of student support awarded by the country of ori-
gin (590). In the writer’s opinion the case-law is more 
likely to develop in relation to own state support so 
that less and less will the Member State be allowed 
to hinder the movement of students by confining 
support to those who enrol in universities within 
their own territory. Here we could see a develop-
ment similar to what has happened in the health-
care services, where Member States might be under 
an obligation to allow the student to transfer to 
another Member State the support that s/he would 
have received at home. Furthermore, the return to 
a more abstract assessment of the legitimacy of 
the rules at issue might signal the development of 
a more mature case-law.
And yet, Förster is a very confusing case and 
leaves open the question as to how much of the 
citizenship case-law is still good law. It might be 
that the ruling is confined to students’ support, 
possibly because this is an area where mobility 
is higher and not uniform across Member States, 
and where therefore the economic impact of a 
generous interpretation of the Treaty provisions 
might be felt more heavily. Thus it could be that, 
in other cases, the impact of the political choices 
made in Directive 2004/38/EC on the CJ’s case-law 
might be more limited. It has been recalled above 
that the CJ in Collins indicated that the Member 
State might refuse a job-seekers’ allowance to a 
migrant job-seeker only to the extent to which the 
latter has not yet established a genuine link with 
the employment market of the host state.  On the 
other hand, Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC 
provides that Member States are not obliged to 
confer entitlement to social assistance to job-
seekers. And Article 14 of Directive 2004/38/EC 
provides that recourse to social assistance shall 
not determine the automatic expulsion of the 
Union citizen (including the job-seeker); and that 
590( ) See Joined Cases C-11 and 12/06 Morgan and Bucher [2007] ECR 
I-9161; and Case C-76/05 Schwarz and Gootjes -Schwarz [2007] ECR 
I-6849, noted by M. Dougan, ‘Cross-border educational mobility and 
the exportation of students’ financial assistance’ (2008), 33 European 
Law Review 723. 
the job-seeker is entitled to stay beyond the first 
three months without having to satisfy any fur-
ther condition if s/he can demonstrate a genuine 
chance of finding employment. Now it is possible 
that, despite the explicit wording of the directive, 
the job-seeker who has demonstrated a genuine 
chance of finding employment, i.e. who is staying 
beyond three months, might have also established 
a real link with the host employment market and 
therefore might be entitled to claim a job-seekers’ 
allowance (591). More generally, and bar a legisla-
tive choice of absolute clarity, the principle of pro-
portionality has become a constitutional principle 
which cannot be disregarded by the legislature. 
vIII. ConCluSIonS
In analysing the impact of the Treaty free move-
ment and citizenship provisions on social security 
coordination we have focused on the ‘constitution-
al’ effects of the case-law, which is to say on that 
case-law that might have future implications for eli-
gibility to welfare provision regardless of regimes 
established by secondary legislation. This case-law 
is characterised by an expansionist approach as 
well as by the development of new hermeneutic 
techniques to enhance the rights of Union citizens 
whilst, at the same time, not interfering with the 
validity of secondary legislation adopted before 
the creation of Union citizenship. Whilst the impli-
cations of this case-law from a constitutional per-
spective are of great significance, the implications 
on welfare provision from a practical perspective 
might be more limited.
In particular, the extent to which a Union citizen 
might claim welfare provision in the host state 
beyond what allowed by secondary legislation 
is constrained by the possibility for the Member 
States to justify imposing residence criteria to 
591( ) On this point see also Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer’s 
opinion in Joined Cases C-22 and 23/08 Vatsouras, opinion delivered 
12 March 2009, case still pending at the time of writing.
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ensure that claimants have established a real, and 
not merely transient, link with the host communi-
ty. In this respect, from a practical perspective, the 
case-law has limited effects for economically inac-
tive claimants: on the one hand, before Unions cit-
izen can qualify for a right of residence beyond the 
first three months, they must meet the conditions 
of economic independence and comprehensive 
(or almost comprehensive) (592) health insurance. 
If those conditions are not satisfied it is open to 
the Member State to refuse the right to reside and 
therefore eliminate the risk of welfare exploitation. 
And it is very unlikely that an economically inactive 
citizen who has resided in the host state for just 
three months would have established a ‘real link’ 
with the host society so as to demand an excep-
tion to the resources/insurance rule. On the other 
hand, whilst a one-off demand on the host wel-
fare society, a temporary difficulty, is not enough 
to terminate the right to reside, repeated claims 
might well place the citizen in the ‘unreasonable 
burden’ category. The grey area, in this respect, 
will emerge in relation to those citizens that have 
resided in the host country long enough to have 
established a ‘real link’, say four years, but who 
are not yet permanent residents. In this respect, 
it is likely that, as noted by Barnard (593), length of 
residence might be relevant in assessing when the 
citizen turns from a ‘reasonable’ to an unreason-
able burden. This said, it cannot be excluded that 
the CJ will now adhere to the provisions of Direc-
tive 2004/38/EC and shift from a constitutional to 
a black-letter approach to welfare entitlement, as 
it did in the case of Förster.
On the other hand, the impact of the citizenship 
provisions might be felt more heavily in relation 
to the reinterpretation of the economic free move-
ment rules, and in relation to eligibility to welfare 
provision within the scope of Regulations (EEC) 
592( ) See Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R. v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2002] ECR I-7091. 
593( ) Barnard, ‘Annotation on Bidar’ (2005), 42 Common Market Law Review 
1465; and ‘EU citizenship and the principle of solidarity’ in M. Dougan 
and E. Spaventa (eds), Social welfare and EU law (Hart Publishing, 
2005), Chapter 8.
Nos 1408/71 or 1612/68. Here, the CJ has used 
the developments which have occurred since the 
Maastricht Treaty as a tool to open up the potenti-
ality inherent in both primary and secondary legis-
lation. Thus, for instance, in Gaumain-Cerri (594), the 
CJ made clear that there is no longer any need to 
closely investigate whether a claimant falls within 
the personal scope of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 
since the combined effect of Union citizenship and 
the non-discrimination provision might lead to 
the same result as that which would be achieved 
should the regulation apply. And, as we have seen 
in detail above, the reinterpretation of Article 39(2) 
might well allow job-seekers to seek at least some 
support from the host state (595).
In relation to claims against the home state, the 
citizenship provisions challenge the limits to the 
exportability of benefits, including non-contribu-
tory benefits. Here, in relation to those situations 
where the risk of benefit fraud is real, the CJ has 
been willing to accept, at least in theory, that a resi-
dence requirement might be necessary. And yet, 
and as demonstrated by rulings such as Hendrix 
and Nerkowska, the burden of demonstrating that a 
residence requirement is truly necessary falls upon 
the Member States. And, after all, the case-law on 
exportability seems entirely consistent with the 
creation of a borderless space where citizens can 
move freely.
Finally, the case-law examined in this contribution 
clearly shows the inherent limits that constrain 
political choices at Community level. Secondary 
legislation might regulate the exercise of Treaty 
rights, but it cannot exhaust the potential of those 
rights. This is demonstrated in the case-law con-
cerning healthcare provision, in the case-law on 
exportability, and in the case-law that departs 
from the limits set by the residence directives (and 
594( ) Joined Cases C-502/01 and C-31/02 Gaumain Cerri and Barth [2004] 
ECR I-6483.
595( ) Case C-138/02 Collins [2004] ECR I-2703; see also Case C-228/07 
Petersen [2008] ECR I-6989.
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now by the citizenship directive) to find that citi-
zens can claim, in primary law, rights which had 
not been granted in secondary legislation. From 
a constitutional perspective this case-law is fully 
defensible; from a political viewpoint this case-law 
might be more problematic in that it might be per-
ceived as an undue interference of the CJ in an area 
which should be left to political negotiation. And 
yet it should not be forgotten that similar criticisms 
were raised against the expansionist case-law on 
the free movement of persons and goods in the 
1970s. History tells us that without that case-law 
the internal market would have remained a chi-
mera and that the political institutions accepted, 
and in some cases codified, the CJ’s approach (596). 
Similarly, the citizenship directive signals the 
acceptance of the main constitutional framework 
relating to citizenship elaborated by the CJ. Maybe 
then the fact that as the area of influence of Com-
munity law grows the citizen is entitled to expect 
a correspondent increase in her rights is far from 
being a heresy.
596( ) See, for example, Directive 2006/123/EC on services in the internal 
market (OJ L 376, 27.12.2006, p. 36).
